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ABSTRACT: The ATLAS experiment is one of the experiments at the Large Hadron Collider, con-
structed to study elementary particle interactions in collisions of high-energy proton beams. The
individual detector components as well as the common experimental infrastructure are supervised
by the Detector Control System (DCS). The DCS enables equipment supervision using operator
commands, reads, processes and archives the operational parameters of the detector, allows for
error recognition and handling, manages the communication with external control systems, and
provides a synchronization mechanism with the physics data acquisition system. Given the enor-
mous size and complexity of ATLAS, special emphasis was put on the use of standardized hard-
ware and software components enabling efficient development and long-term maintainability of the
DCS over the lifetime of the experiment. Currently, the DCS is being used successfully during the
experiment commissioning phase.
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ATLAS is a general purpose High Energy Physics (HEP) experiment, scheduled to start data taking
in 2008 at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN, Geneva, Switzerland. Its scale is unprece-
dented in HEP, in both terms of size — the detector elements are distributed over a cylindrical
volume of 25 m diameter and 50 m length — and organization — more than 2000 people of 167
institutions in 37 countries contribute to the project. The ATLAS experiment [1] consists of three
detectors, the inner tracker, the calorimeter, and the muon system, each of which is composed of
several sub-detectors. The complexity of these detectors, containing a huge number of individual
detector elements — the Pixel sub-detector alone already accounts for 60 million electronic chan-
nels — presented new challenges for the design and the implementation of the Detector Control
System (DCS) for ATLAS.
The DCS has the task to permit coherent and safe operation of ATLAS and to serve as a
homogeneous interface to all sub-detectors and to the technical infrastructure of the experiment.
The DCS must be able to bring the detector into any desired operational state, to continuously
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and to allow manual or automatic actions to be taken. In order to synchronize the state of the
detector with the operation of the physics data acquisition system, bi-directional communication
between DCS and run control must be provided. Finally, the DCS has to handle the communication
between the ATLAS sub-detectors and other systems which are controlled independently, such as
the LHC accelerator, the CERN technical services, the ATLAS magnets and the Detector Safety
System (DSS).
The Joint Controls Project (JCOP) [2] was founded in order to maximize synergy effects for
the DCS of the four experiments at the LHC by using common DCS components. Within JCOP,
standards for the use of DCS hardware were established and a commercial controls software prod-
uct has been selected to serve as the basis for all DCS applications. This software package was
substantially extended by a comprehensive framework of software components and implementa-
tion policies.
This paper focuses on the DCS architecture, common hardware components and standards,
the design and implementation of the DCS back-end software, as well as operational aspects. A
detailed description of the specific sub-detector control system hardware can be found in [1] and
references therein. The paper is structured as follows: after a short summary of the requirements,
an overview of the system architecture will be given in section 3. The hardware and software
components will be presented in detail in section 4 and 5 respectively, and the description of the
data flow will follow in section 6. The overall operations layer is discussed in section 7, followed
in section 8 by an overview of the individual controls applications with emphasis on the common
infrastructure of the experiment.
2. Requirements
The ATLAS experiment is hierarchically organized in a tree-like structure of detectors, sub-
detectors, sub-systems, etc. with each element having a certain level of operational independence.
This must be reflected in design and implementation of the DCS. The timescale of more than three
decades for the R&D, construction and exploitation phases requires the control system to be able to
evolve from small, very flexible stand-alone systems for prototyping and component assembly up
to the final size for integrated operation of the experiment as a whole. The DCS has also to support
different modes of operation, ranging from stand-alone running of components, e.g. for mainte-
nance or calibration, up to coherent physics data taking. Given the large variety of equipment
to be controlled, the standardization of the hardware and of the software interfaces is of primary
importance for the homogeneous control of all different detector components, enabling the devel-
opment of a uniform operator interface as well as minimizing implementation and maintenance
efforts. Due to the enormous number of individual channels to be supervised by the DCS — sev-
eral 100.000 parameters in total — the design and implementation must provide a high level of
scalability. As the DCS needs to interact with various control systems outside of ATLAS, flexible
and platform-independent interfaces must be provided.
The experiment itself is located in a cavern 100 m underground and is not accessible during
operation because of the presence of ionizing radiation. Therefore, the control system must be
fault-tolerant and allow remote diagnostics. In particular, the dependence of low-level control
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3. Overall system design
3.1 ATLAS operation model
The ATLAS experiment is operated by two collaborating systems: the DCS and the Trigger and
Data-Acquisition (TDAQ) [3] system. The former constantly supervises the hardware of the exper-
iment and its infrastructure. The latter performs the read out of detector data generated by proton
collisions — the “physics events” — and directs the data streams from the digitizers to mass stor-
age. Thus TDAQ operates only during physics data taking periods for which it also takes control of
the DCS. The DCS is responsible for continuous monitoring and control of the detector equipment
and is supervised by a human operator in the control room.
3.2 System architecture
For the implementation of the DCS, commercial solutions are used wherever possible. Within
the frame of JCOP, a comprehensive market survey of industrial Supervisory Controls And Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems has been carried out and the product ProzessVisualisierungs- and
SteuerungsSystem (PVSS II) [4] from the company ETM has been selected. PVSS is a device-
oriented and event-driven control system which can be distributed over a large number of PCs
running Windows or Linux as operating system.
Figure 1 shows the DCS architecture which is organized in Front-End (FE) equipment and
a Back-End (BE) system. For the connection of the BE system to the FE, the industrial fieldbus
CAN [5] has been chosen in most of the cases, while some devices are connected using Ethernet
or Modbus. Whenever possible, the industry standard OPC [6] is used as the software protocol for
communications. Otherwise, application-specific protocols have been developed.
The FE equipment consists of purpose-built electronics and their associated services such as
power supplies or cooling circuits. In addition, a general purpose I/O and processing unit called
Embedded Local Monitor Board (ELMB) [7] was developed, which can operate in the high mag-
netic field and under ionizing radiation in the cavern. It can either be embedded in the electronics
of detector elements or directly read out sensors in a stand-alone manner. The BE is organized in
three layers (see figure 1): the Local Control Stations (LCS) for process control of subsystems, the
Sub-detector Control Stations (SCS) for high-level control of a sub-detector allowing stand-alone
operation, and the Global Control Stations (GCS) with server applications and human interfaces
in the ATLAS control room for the overall operation. In total, the BE consists of more than 150
PCs, connected as a distributed system for which PVSS handles inter-process communication via
the local area network. The full BE hierarchy from the operator interface down to the level of
individual devices is represented by a distributed Finite State Machine (FSM) mechanism allowing
for standardized operation and error handling in each functional layer.
4. Hardware components
The ATLAS DCS uses the CAN industrial fieldbus and the CANopen [5] protocol for its FE I/O,
where possible and appropriate. CAN was selected by the CERN fieldbus working group [8] due to
it’s low cost, flexibility and especially due to its insensitivity to magnetic fields, in contrast to e.g.
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Figure 1. ATLAS DCS architecture.
the monitoring of environmental parameters such as temperature and humidity, the configuration
and monitoring of detector FE electronics, and the control and monitoring of power supplies. Many
of the electronics systems in and around the detector are custom designs, done by various groups
from all over the world.
In general, important requirements for the DCS FE I/O are:
• low cost (i.e. use of commercial components),
• low power consumption,
• high I/O channel density.
If the FE I/O electronics is located in the detector cavern there are additional requirements to
be met:
• remote firmware upgrades must be possible,
• insensitivity to magnetic fields,
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Figure 2. Block diagram of the ELMB, showing the separately powered board sections. The indicated
currents are typical for no readout activity.
4.1 ELMB
In order to avoid redundant R&D and maintenance efforts for FE I/O solutions and to promote
a common solution for interfacing custom designs to the DCS, the ELMB was conceived and
developed since no commercial solution existed which satisfied all requirements.
The ELMB features a 8-bit microcontroller (ATmega128 from ATMEL [9]) with single clock-
cycle instructions running at 4 MHz, analog and digital I/O, and a CAN bus interface. Care was
taken to select components that comply with the magnetic field and radiation requirements. Further,
the ELMB can be embedded within custom designs, connecting electronics and/or sensors with the
higher levels of the DCS hierarchy using the CAN bus interface.
4.1.1 ELMB Hardware
In figure 2, a block diagram of the ELMB is shown. The ELMB is divided into three sections which
are separately grounded and powered, and are interconnected by opto-couplers. Each section has
a voltage regulator with current and thermal protection, safe-guarding against Single-Event-Latch-
up. The typical current consumption of each section is shown.
The ELMB provides 64 differential analog inputs, an analog multiplexer and an Analogue to
Digital Converter (ADC) with a resolution of 16 bits, as well as 32 digital I/O lines. The ADC can
be configured for 6 different voltage ranges between −2 V and +5 V, unipolar or bipolar. In ad-
dition, a 3-wire Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI), used on-board for accessing the CAN-controller,
allows to control additional components. Finally, In-System-Programming (ISP) and Universal
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analog section with ADC and multiplexer circuitry for the analog input channels may be omitted if
only digital I/O is needed. The size of the ELMB board is 50×67 mm2.
In order to provide standardized connectivity for stand-alone applications, a general purpose
motherboard was developed with connectors for digital I/O, analog inputs, CAN and power [10]. It
also contains sockets for signal conditioning adapters for all analog input channels. Using different
adapters, several sensor types such as NTC10k, 2-wire PT1000 or 4-wire PT100 can be directly
connected to the motherboard. Further, a dedicated adapter allows the use of an external Digital to
Analog Converter (DAC), e.g. in order to control high voltage power supplies using analog signals.
The radiation levels within the experiment cavern outside of the inner detector were estimated
in [11] to range from 0.4 Gy per year in the hadronic calorimeter and up to 900 Gy per year in the
forward direction. These dose limits contain a safety factor of 5. Since the ELMB contains off-
the-shelf components for which the radiation tolerance was a priori unknown, a series of extensive
radiation tests [7] was performed with the ELMB using a dedicated CERN test facility [12]. The
ELMB was qualified for use at locations in the experiment with radiation levels not exceeding 1 Gy
per year including a safety factor of 10 compared to the tolerance determined by these tests. All
ELMBs used for the DCS have been placed in locations shielded by the calorimeters such that the
specified dose will not be exceeded during the foreseen lifetime of ATLAS. Special components
available for space applications were several orders of magnitudes more expensive at the time of
the ELMB design phase and thus not considered for use for the ELMB in order to meet the low-cost
requirement.
Finally, the ELMB had to be insensitive to magnetic field strengths exceeding 1 T present
within the ATLAS toroidal fields. During a dedicated test, for which an ELMB prototype was ex-
posed to a magnetic field of up to 1.4 T, no influence of the magnetic field on operational parameters
and data acquisition could be found [13].
4.1.2 ELMB software
The embedded software for the microcontroller on the ELMB is written in the C programming
language.
General purpose software. The microcontroller flash memory is programmed with two applica-
tions:
• a bootloader,
• a general purpose CANopen I/O application [14].
The bootloader enables in-situ upgrades of the user application firmware remotely via the
CAN bus. At power-up the bootloader takes control over the ELMB, allowing to upload new
application software into the flash memory. This upgrade process via the CAN bus, which also
uses the CANopen protocol, can even be performed while other nodes on the same bus continue
normal operation. The bootloader cannot be erased from the memory remotely.
The general purpose CANopen application supports the analog and digital ports of the ELMB
allowing its usage without need for additional firmware development. At production stage, this
same application is used to test the ELMB hardware, as well as calibrating the 6 voltage ranges of
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The general purpose application supports, by means of the on-board ADC and multiplexers,
64 analog input channels, up to 16 digital inputs and up to 16 digital outputs. In addition it provides
support for an external DAC module with up to 64 analog outputs. The application conforms to
the CANopen DS-401 Device Profile for I/O modules [5]. Many features of the application are
configurable and can be saved in the EEPROM. Such settings are typically read or written using
CANopen SDO (Service Data Object) messages.
The so-called “process data” — the analog and digital inputs and outputs — can efficiently be
read out or written to using CANopen PDO (Process Data Object) messages. A PDO message is a
non-confirmed CAN message with one sender and one or more receivers, containing no additional
protocol overhead and up to 8 Bytes of data. The PDOs can be configured for asynchronous trans-
mission. In this case digital inputs are transmitted on change, and analog inputs are transmitted
whenever a value exceeds a predefined threshold.
Special attention has been given to prevent faulty program behavior due to Single-Event-Effect
due to radiation, resulting from bit-flips in on-board memory or registers. This affects mainly RAM
and device registers, and to a much lesser extent flash memory and EEPROM. These software
measures taken include:
• use of the microcontroller Watchdog Timer,
• periodic refresh of microcontroller, CAN-controller and ADC register where possible (values
are copied from flash or EEPROM memory),
• rarely changing configuration parameters are (re)read from EEPROM prior to each use,
• a majority voting scheme for CAN buffer management variables,
• full CAN-controller reset when no message has been received for a certain period of time,
• Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) on parameter blocks in EEPROM memory and on program
code in flash memory,
• mask off unused bits in variables (e.g. a boolean uses one Byte but is only 1-bit significant).
A special version of the application supports a remotely configurable CAN node identifier
or address by means of standard CANopen messages. This address is subsequently stored in the
EEPROM, overriding the on-board switch address setting.
Finally, the application supports two additional protection mechanisms, “Node Guarding” and
“Life Guarding”. Node Guarding in CANopen is a mechanism whereby a Network Management
(NMT) master checks the state of nodes on the bus at regular intervals in two different ways:
• The master sends a Remote Transmission Request (RTR) for a Node Guard message to each
node on the bus; a node that receives the RTR, sends the Node Guard message which contains
one data byte indicating the (CANopen) state of the node, as well as a toggle bit. If a node
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• Each node on the bus sends a heartbeat message at regular intervals. The NMT master
monitors the messages and signals inactive nodes which did not send a heartbeat message
within a certain timeout period to the higher-level software and/or takes an appropriate action.
Life Guarding in CANopen is a mechanism whereby a node checks the communication with its
host or master, by applying a timeout on messages received. If a Life Guarding timeout occurs, the
node should take the appropriate action. The general purpose application resets and re-initializes
the CAN-controller and tries to resume normal operation, after sending a CANopen Emergency
message.
User-specific software. The source code of the general purpose CANopen application for the
ELMB is available for users who want to customize this application software to fit their specific
needs. Alternatively, a CANopen firmware framework for the ELMB is available for users who
want to develop custom I/O and control, but want to benefit from a ready-to-use framework that
handles all CAN communications transparently. The only requirement for user application software
is that the interface to the outside world has to be compliant with the CANopen protocol, thus
facilitating integration with the ATLAS DCS.
4.2 Standardized commercial systems
The ATLAS DCS uses as much standardized equipment as possible in order to reduce the amount
of development and maintenance efforts required. Due to the complexity and specialization of the
ATLAS detector, some of the FE equipment needs to be purpose built. However, associated ser-
vices were standardized in many cases. This section gives details on the standardized commercial
electronics that have been selected for use by the experiment.
4.2.1 VME crates
The industrial standard VME has been selected to house electronics. VME crates are placed in the
underground electronics rooms, which are not effected by radiation or magnetic field. A common
project was set up for the procurement of complete powered and cooled crates for the four LHC
experiments.
The crates provide monitoring of the cooling fans (speed, status etc.), of temperature at various
points and of general status information (for example, power on/off, error etc.), and allow for
commands to be given such as switch on/off and crate reset.
4.2.2 Power supplies
The DCS makes large use of the ELMB for reading sensors which need to be powered. Due to the
distribution of these modules over the full volume of the detector, the power required is distributed
via the CAN bus cables. For this purpose, a Power Supply Unit (PSU) [15] was designed and
produced. This CAN PSU supplies 12 V and a maximum of 3 A, which is sufficient to power up to
a maximum of 63 ELMBs per bus. Up to 16 of these buses may be powered by a single CAN PSU,
for which the current and voltage can be monitored for each bus independently. Additionally, with
the PSU it is possible to switch the power for each bus individually.
The DCS must further monitor and control the power supplies for the detector electronics, for
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currents, over-voltage and over-current protection for the equipment, and thermal supervision. As
for the ELMBs and ELMB PSUs, OPC has been chosen to be the mandatory controls interface to
the DCS (see also section 5.3).
The standard approach was to define a modular system where crates and controllers are com-
mon and different power supply modules are selected as needed. There are two types of imple-
mentation possible. One solution is to have the complete power supply situated in the underground
electronics rooms, where the environment is safe. This is however not practical for low voltages
with high currents because of large voltage drops in the 200 m long cables. This was avoided by
separating control unit and power module, leaving the former in the counting room and placing the
latter in the cavern. The cable between the two can then carry a higher voltage with less current.
Following this approach, the power supply modules must be sufficiently radiation tolerant and must
be able to operate in a strong magnetic field. The choice of individual power supply models varies
between the different sub-detectors for which details can be found in [1] and references therein.
4.2.3 DCS Control Station PC
The hardware platform for the BE system is an industrial, rack-mounted PC. The applications in
the LCS require good I/O capability, whereas the applications in the GCS are mainly processing-
intensive. As a consequence, two different PC models have been chosen as the standard. A common
requirement for both is stability of operation and robustness against hardware failures. Therefore,
both models feature redundant, hot-swappable power supplies and disk shadowing. The system
configuration of the LCS machines includes two Intel Xeon processors (3 GHz), 2 disks (250 GB
each), 2 GB RAM, and an Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) for remote control.
They have 3 PCI slots available, e.g. to house CAN interface boards. The GCS machines feature
two Intel Xeon quad-core processors (2.33 GHz), 2 disks (500 GB each), 8 GB RAM, and also an
IPMI interface. For the SCS the model is selected, which fits best the needs.
As operating system either Windows or Linux is used, the former mainly for the LCS be-
cause of the OPC protocol, the latter for the operator interfaces and servers in the GCS layer. The
operating system is downloaded from central servers via the network.
5. Software components
5.1 PVSS
The commercial SCADA package PVSS is the main framework for the ATLAS BE applications. As
the ATLAS DCS will read out and process data from more than 200.000 sensors, it was necessary
to find a solution which provides sufficient scalability with respect to distributed computing and
different controls application tasks. Four main concepts of PVSS make it suitable for a large scale
control system implementation such as the ATLAS DCS:
• A control station (PC) runs a so-called “Project” which contains a number of processes,
called “Managers”. Different types of Managers may be used depending upon the type of



































































































Figure 3. PVSS Manager structure showing the respective functional layers. Several Projects can be
connected via LAN to form a Distributed System.
• Each PVSS Project uses a central database for all current data values, stored in objects called
“Datapoints”. All Managers have full database access for which PVSS provides transpar-
ent synchronization. Data processing is performed in an event-based approach using multi-
threaded callback routines upon value changes.
• Different Projects can be connected via LAN to form a “Distributed System” allowing to
remotely access the databases and events of all connected Projects. This provides scalability
up to the full size of the ATLAS DCS with in excess of 150 different control stations.
• A generic Application Programming Interface (API) allows to extend the functionality of
control applications using additional software components.
Figure 3 shows the different process layers of a PVSS Project. In the following, the PVSS
functionality is briefly described with respect to these layers and the relevance for the DCS is
discussed.
In order to interface with the FE hardware, PVSS offers a number of Managers — “Drivers”
— that allow for industry standard protocols to be used. In particular, Drivers for data read-out via
Modbus, for communication with Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), and OPC are available.
Within the communication and storage layer, data is processed by a central “Event Man-
ager” which broadcasts value changes to other Managers which may also be located within re-
mote Projects connected via the “Distribution Manager”. The data can be made persistent using
an “Archive Manager” that stores data into a relational database and allows for the information
to be read back into PVSS for the purpose of diagnostics, e.g. using trend plots as described in
section 5.8. More importantly, the use of a relational database permits data access from other ap-
plications completely independent of PVSS such as detector calibration and physics data analysis
programs (see also section 5.7).
Control procedures in the application layer are programmed in a C-like scripting language
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dynamic type conversion, and the possibility to develop and change the application at run-time
while at the same time protecting the low level data acquisition and processing. Further, Control
scripts can run as stand-alone processes for which PVSS ensures continuous running without the
necessity of human interaction. For more application-specific requirements beyond the intrinsic
Control functionality, PVSS allows for the development of custom Managers and shared libraries
through a C++ API.
The User Interface (UI) layer consists of dedicated Managers which interpret user-built panels
accessing the Datapoints via Control scripts and display control system conditions and processes
to an operator. Any UI can be protected by an access control mechanism restricting the interaction
with all other Managers according to predefined privileges.
PVSS is available for the Windows and Linux operating systems and provides a process mon-
itoring mechanism which ensures the continuous availability of all Managers for every Project
running on the respective control station.
5.2 JCOP Framework
The JCOP Framework (FW) [2] consists of a set of guidelines, components and tools designed
to facilitate the implementation of homogeneous controls applications for the LHC experiments
using PVSS. The FW guidelines define a naming convention for PVSS Datapoints, functions and
files, and also cover the standard look and feel of the graphical interfaces of the control system.
The FW components ease the integration of standard hardware devices such as the ELMB or com-
mercial power supplies and provide all required functionality to monitor and control the detector
electronics racks and cooling systems. The FW also provides a component to retrieve information
from external systems such as the ATLAS magnets, the LHC accelerator and the CERN technical
infrastructure. The list of FW components comprises:
• a Finite State Machine (FSM) toolkit that allows to model the hierarchical organization of
the control system and to sequence the operation of the detector according to a well-defined
set of states and possible transitions,
• a configuration database component, which may be used for homogeneous storing and access
of configuration parameters in a relational database external to PVSS,
• a generic interface between the FSM and the Configuration Database designed to automate
the handling of the configuration data required at run-time,
• tools to configure and display trends of PVSS data,
• a multi-platform middleware for inter-process communication called Distributed Information
Management (DIM) [16], together with a simplified version specialized for reliable data
transfer — the Data Interchange Protocol (DIP),
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• a System Configuration Database which holds the overall layout of the control system and
the relations between its constituents, e.g. arrangements of computers, PVSS Projects, and
software revisions,
• a user interface to the PVSS alert system tailored to the needs of the LHC experiments,
• an access control component providing a detailed authorization scheme assigning sets of
operator privileges to operator roles with respect to detector subsystems,
• a Farm Monitoring and Control component for the computers used in the control system,
• a System Overview Tool, which monitors the integrity of the different Managers for the
complete Distributed System of PVSS stations,
• a centralized software management tool, which allows the remote administration of FW com-
ponents in all DCS computers from a central console.
The modular approach followed by the FW promotes standardization within the control ap-
plications and allows for the reutilization of code, significantly reducing development and mainte-
nance efforts.
5.3 CANopen OPC server
A CANopen OPC server has been developed in order to control data sources connected to CAN
bus and to acquire their data. This data is then made available to the PVSS system using the
interface OPC which is a standard providing a mechanism for communicating with numerous data
sources. It is based on the COM/DCOM [17] technology of Microsoft. The specification describes
the OPC COM objects and their interfaces, implemented by an OPC server. The server allows for
concurrent communication of different applications with the same hardware, supports all interfaces
and requirements of the OPC Data Access Specification, and can work both with local and remote
clients.
The OPC server transfers data to the devices using the high-level protocol CANopen. This
protocol defines how to read and write data using asynchronous and synchronous modes, as well
as supervising the CAN bus itself and any connected CAN bus devices.
A CAN bus consists of several fieldbus nodes containing a microcontroller with firmware. The
nodes send and receive messages of up to 8 Bytes in length and a header (integer number) called
the “Communication Object Identifier” (COB_ID). In the case of the ELMB, data from several
sensors use a single COB_ID which allows the number of devices in the system to be reduced.
The CANopen OPC server supports this multiplexing of messages and can translate the values into
separate objects used by PVSS.
The CANopen OPC Server consists of two components, with the first implementing all OPC
interfaces to which any application such as the PVSS OPC Driver may be connected. The second
part represents a hardware-dependent implementation of the interaction mechanism between the
CAN bus driver and CANopen devices. It was developed as a COM component, which allows
the porting to new hardware interfaces with minimum effort. There are implementations of this
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Figure 4. FSM toolkit concept (taken from [20]). Device-oriented objects (Dev) can be grouped into do-
mains represented by Control Units (CU) arranged in several layers. State changes are propagated upwards,
and commands downwards in the hierarchy. Operator interfaces can obtain control over any object within
the individual layers.
The CANopen OPC server imports all information needed to define its address space (i.e. the
named data available to the OPC client) from a configuration file. The configuration file defines the
names of all data sources which the OPC client can use to read from and write data to.
5.4 The Finite State Machine toolkit
The representation of all detector control elements by a Finite State Machine (FSM) is a key el-
ement in the homogeneous control of the heterogeneous collection of detector FE systems. The
JCOP FSM [20, 21] provides a generic, platform-independent, and object-oriented implementa-
tion of a state machine toolkit for a highly distributed environment, interfaced to a PVSS control
application.
5.4.1 State Machine logic, structuring, and object orientation
The FSM toolkit allows for the design and implementation of dedicated state machines of the
detector FE systems and of software procedures. The collection of these device-oriented state
machines can be structured by layers of higher-level state machines. These derive their own state
from the levels below via programmable logic, allowing the complete detector control system to be
supervised by a single state machine unit (see figure 4).
Following an object-oriented approach, the programmable behavior of the FSM units are de-
fined in FSM object types. The device-oriented types implement their state and state transition
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Figure 5. SMI inter-process communication (taken from [20]).
logical object types are programmed using the rule-based State Manager Language (SML) [21]
which allows the use of type-oriented state and command logic in interaction with other FSM units.
The actual FSM hierarchy is formed by object instantiation and the definition of object relationship.
5.4.2 Inter-Process Communication and Partitioning
The FSM objects are grouped into State Manager Interface (SMI) domain processes. The individ-
ual processes communicate via the DIM protocol and thus can be distributed within a LAN. The
device-oriented objects are interfaced via a proxy process represented by the PVSS application (see
figure 5).
In order to be able to operate different detector parts independently, individual SMI domains
can be separated from the control hierarchy. Further, the partitioning capabilities of the FSM
toolkit allow operating parts of the hierarchy in distinct modes. Device-oriented FSM objects can
be detached from the tree (“Disabled”) such that they do not propagate their state nor receive
commands. FSM domain objects called “Control Unit” (CU) can be put into the following modes:
• Included – the state and command propagation is enabled,
• Excluded – the state and command propagation is disabled,
• Ignored – the state propagation is disabled but commands are accepted,
















Figure 6. JCOP FW Access Control data model for user authorization.
5.4.3 Object persistency and user interfaces
The attributes of any instantiated FSM object inside a SMI domain are made persistent within
Datapoints of the associated PVSS project. This allows for archiving of the FSM states and transi-
tions and provides a framework for monitoring and control of the FSM functionality using PVSS
user interfaces. In particular, the FSM toolkit contains operator interface software elements pro-
viding control over FSM object attributes, transitions, and ownership. An operator can obtain the
ownership over a CU and its associated objects via the user interface in two different modes: The
“Exclusive Mode” for which only the user interface of the owner can alter object attributes and send
commands, and the “Shared Mode” allowing access via any interfaces, however without permitting
to change the object ownership.
5.5 Access control
Access Control (AC) for different control aspects within ATLAS DCS is provided by a set of tools
restricting access to the control interfaces to authorized users. In addition to the protection of the
FSM operator interface, AC may be applied to the sub-detector’s expert panels. The DCS AC mech-
anism is based on the JCOP FW Access Control component while the administration of the access
privileges is performed using a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [22] repository.
The data model of the access control defined by the JCOP FW AC package is shown in figure 6.
A control domain is a part of the control system, which has certain sets of control privileges
defined, e.g. the possibility to access or modify data elements of a particular PVSS Project. Any
DCS subsystem, such as an individual sub-detector, can be declared as a control domain. A set of
pairs <domain, privilege> called “Role” corresponds to a group of users with certain rights.
The component comprises a graphical user interface for the AC administration and an API
for applying access control in the project panels. A common access control policy for a whole
distributed system of PVSS stations is provided by means of an AC server implementation which
ensures the synchronization of authorization data. The user administration and the authentication
mechanism are outsourced to a LDAP repository.
As an extension of the functionality of the FW AC component, the authorization data consist-
ing of the list of users and associated Roles are downloaded to the DCS AC server periodically
or on request, while the user authentication is performed at run-time using standardized LDAP
routines. Availability of the access control mechanism in case of network problems is provided
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5.6 Configuration database
The ATLAS DCS configuration database (ConfDB) is designed to manage the setting of the de-
tector and DCS parameters (such as calibration constants, voltage settings, and alarm thresholds)
depending upon the operation mode of the experiment. Furthermore, it stores the configuration
of DCS equipment. The ConfDB is arranged as a set of Oracle databases (one per sub-detector)
available for all DCS applications.
ConfDB access is based on the Configuration DB FW component which defines the data model
comprising two main entities. A “Configuration” contains sets of devices with their static proper-
ties, for example HW addresses, archiving settings, etc. The “Recipe” is a set of values that are
run-time specific, such as set points for output channels and alert thresholds, which may change
depending on the detector operation mode.
The Configuration DB component includes a graphical user interface, which allows an expert
to manage the database connection, and to store/retrieve Configurations and Recipes for selected
sets of devices in an interactive mode. Advanced facilities include editing recipes, viewing the
database tables, and executing queries using the Structured Query Language (SQL).
The generic API provides database access and Configuration/Recipe handling routines for
PVSS applications which allow for event driven detector configuration depending on specific run
conditions. The typical use case for Recipes at run-time is a Control script which continuously
analyzes the current detector subsystem condition, selects and retrieves the proper Recipe on the
base of the Recipe name and/or version, and applies them to the PVSS application. The main use
cases for Configurations is restoring a set of devices interactively during a possible system recovery.
The configuration data can be used within offline reconstruction and analysis routines independent
from PVSS.
Within the ATLAS DCS, the ConfDB FW component has been extended providing the sub-
detector control system developers with:
• a user interface template comprising, in particular, two levels of access rights (operator and
expert) for storing and applying Configurations and Recipes,
• a set of generic functions, allowing the storage and retrieval of the configuration DB entities,
taking into account the ATLAS DCS naming convention.
Altogether, the ConfDB software components guarantee that the configuration data is stored
homogeneously at a single centrally supported location, enabling efficient run-time access and
providing reliability and maintainability.
5.7 Conditions database
The ATLAS detector conditions data are stored in a relational database (CondDB) for efficient ac-
cess by any offline calibration, reconstruction, and analysis applications. The database is accessed
by a dedicated API, called COOL [23], and was highly optimized for the offline applications only
instead of being used for diagnosing detector problems. The amount of data stored in the CondDB
must be kept to a minimum because of the two following main reasons:
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Figure 7. Flow of data through the archiving chain from the PVSS application to the COOL database.
• extensive data processing is required for analysis, therefore searching large amounts of con-
ditions data for the required information is an unnecessary overhead.
As a consequence, only selected conditions data acquired by DCS using the PVSS archiving facil-
ity, which was optimized for writing data rather than reading, must be transferred into the CondDB
using COOL.
COOL stores logically grouped data into “folders”. Similarly, PVSS has the concept of Data-
points that hold real-time data from FE equipment, grouped in a structure for a given device. There-
fore, a dedicated process — PVSS2COOL — reads selected PVSS data from the PVSS archive
database using a generic access API (CORAL) [24], maps the data from PVSS Datapoints into
COOL folders of a corresponding structure, and writes it into the CondDB (see figure 7). Data-
point types, which represent devices, are associated with corresponding folders, which will then
allow data from one or more of each type of device to be stored in the folder.
The configuration for the COOL folders and the data they should contain is defined within
PVSS, allowing the sub-detector DCS experts to structure the data for offline analysis. Once the
configuration is completed, PVSS2COOL is used to create the folders in the COOL database. After
the folders have been created, the transfer process runs at predefined time intervals, replicating and
transposing the data into the format required for COOL. For performance reasons, the time intervals
for bulk data transport must be optimized. Short time intervals result in performance losses due to
increased transaction overhead. Large time intervals will not only delay the availability of data, but
may cause the amount of data to be transferred exceeding a tolerable limit.
5.8 Data visualization
All values received from PVSS may be stored in a database in order to allow for diagnostics of
problems and to check the evolution of values over time. In order to be able to study the historical
data in an efficient and convenient way, e.g. by comparing values of different data sources against
each other, dedicated data visualization tools are required.
The main use cases are:
• the display of trends for individual DCS parameters by the operator in the ATLAS Control
room with the option to show data for a selected time interval in the past,
• more sophisticated visualization plots such as histograms, profiles, and scatter plots to allow
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Figure 8. PVSS trend showing a temperature value over time.
• a web-based display to view data and to diagnose incidents.
Common requirements for the different display methods are such that the selection of the
required data must be intuitive to use, and that the load on the server supplying the data must be
minimal and must not influence the stability and availability of the DCS BE.
The two examples of visualization tools described below are available and more advanced
tools are being developed.
5.8.1 PVSS trending
The PVSS trending allows the viewing of historical data from within PVSS applications. Tools are
available for the selection of what data should be shown and a trend plot may then be displayed, as
shown in figure 8.
The tool features standard graphics capabilities including changing scales and multiple data
display formats. In addition, data which are marked as invalid by the hardware, are displayed by
PVSS in a different style.
5.8.2 ROOT viewer
Another data viewer is based on the graphics and analysis package ROOT [25] and has full access
to all data within the PVSS Oracle archive. The implementation is completely independent from
PVSS.
Data can be selected by data source identifiers allowing the usage of pattern matches using
wildcards, and be displayed for a chosen time interval with the option of real-time refreshing of the
current values. The data may be represented as a trend (as shown in figure 9), as a 2D surface plot
or as a histogram.
Any selected data can be stored using the native ROOT format thus allowing more complex
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Figure 10. Data exchange between ATLAS DCS and external control systems via DIP.
5.9 Connection to external control systems
The data exchange between the ATLAS DCS and external control systems is handled via DIP.
This protocol is a thin layer on top of the DIM process communication interface designed for
highly reliable event-based data transfer. As illustrated in figure 10, a DIP server publishes data
items to a dedicated name server. A client process fetches the server publication information from
the name server and subscribes at the DIP server to selected data items, resulting in an event-
triggered, pushed data transfer from the server to the client. A JCOP FW component provides a
DIP server and client implementation for PVSS — a DIP Manager — including user interfaces for
user-friendly publication and subscription handling.
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mation Server (DCS IS) in the GCS layer (see figure 1). Information from the external systems is
transferred via DIP into the IS PVSS Project, thus made available to all DCS stations within the
Distributed System, and stored in the PVSS Oracle Archive. A generic error handling mechanism
using the DIP quality monitoring facilities has been implemented for all subscriptions on the DCS
IS signaling any error condition related to the DIP communication via the PVSS alarm system.
5.10 DCS-TDAQ communication
The DCS-TDAQ Communication (DDC) package has been developed for the information exchange
between the DCS and the TDAQ system and for coherent control of the experiment during physics
data taking periods. DDC provides the following functionality:
• the execution of DCS control commands triggered by the TDAQ system, which may or may
not be synchronized to FSM transitions, reporting success or failure of the command back to
TDAQ,
• the bi-directional data exchange between TDAQ and DCS,
• the transfer of DCS alarms and messages to TDAQ.
The DDC package is integrated into the ATLAS TDAQ software [26] and uses several of
its facilities. The command transfer facility is implemented as a custom application (DDC Con-
troller) on the base of the TDAQ Run Control (RC) package. For the execution of “Non-transition
Commands” (see below) the TDAQ Information Service (TDAQ IS) is used. The data transfer is
performed via the TDAQ IS, while the DCS messages are passed via the TDAQ Message Reporting
System. All DDC facilities use the DIM package for inter-process communication.
The TDAQ RC and the DCS implement different state models requiring a state synchroniza-
tion logic which defines a correspondence between both. The synchronization is provided by the
DDC controller that triggers the necessary DCS action as a result of a TDAQ RC FSM transition
according to its configuration. Alternatively, the Non-transition Command facility allows DCS ac-
tions to be triggered asynchronously with TDAQ RC transitions. These commands could be the
reset of an individual device or the execution of a calibration sequence triggered by an operator, or
an automatic action initiated by a TDAQ application.
5.11 Software management
Due to the size of the control system, the large diversity of software elements and the long lifetime
of the experiments, a centralized software management strategy was adopted for the ATLAS DCS.
This approach addresses the following points:
• multi-user/multi-location development of the controls applications,
• integration of the different software elements of the control system,
• visualization of the current organization of the system,
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• version handling of the software components,
• minimization of the downtime by permitting to restore a system to the last known configura-
tion in the event of system failures.
The software management approach distinguishes two main aspects:
• the set-up of the basic infrastructure of the computers,
• the installation and configuration of the PVSS Projects.
The software infrastructure management, such as the installation of the operating system and
security patches, and the deployment of a set of common applications, such as PVSS, OPC servers,
etc., is handled with the tools recommended by the CERN Computer Network Infrastructure and
Controls [27] working group. In particular, the Computer Management Framework (CMF) is used
to handle computers operated by Microsoft Windows, and Linux for Controls (L4C) is used for
machines running the Linux operating system. Although CMF and L4C share the same design
principles, they have been implemented as two separate schemes: while in CMF the desired soft-
ware configuration of the computers is defined using a graphical interface and is stored in a central
database, the L4C scheme uses a template-based approach using a tree structure of editable text
files. In both cases the configuration information is accessed by software daemons running on
the nodes in order to carry out the installation or un-installation of applications according to the
contents of the database or templates.
The PVSS Project management is covered by the usage of the FW Component Installation
Tool and a central software repository containing the application components specific to the indi-
vidual PVSS Project. The functionality of the FW Component Installation Tool is two-fold. On one
hand, the tool allows developers to package the PVSS-based applications as individual components
that can be installed in different Projects. On the other hand, the tool permits to manage the list of
PVSS-based components installed in a set of computers. This is achieved by defining the desired
configuration of the nodes in a central configuration database. The database provides versioning of
different software configurations, enabling a DCS station to be restored to a previous configuration
in the event of failure. The FW Component Installation Tool provides graphical interfaces to man-
age the contents of the database and to give an overview of the configuration in the database. The
database is accessed by the software agents of the FW Component Installation Tool running in the
remote nodes that perform the installation or un-installation of the PVSS components according to
the contents of the database.
PVSS application elements such as user interfaces and Control scripts and libraries, as well
as FW components are stored in a central repository located on a shared network drive. All these
components can thus be consistently accessed from LCS, SCS or GCS Systems as well as from
outside of the DCS BE, avoiding additional management efforts to keep track of differences in
the local software installations. In order to keep track of development, the contents of the central
repository is tagged into the Concurrent Versions System (CVS) [28]. The repository is cached
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6. Read-Out chain
Figure 11 shows a typical example of the readout chain based on the ELMB. The ELMB are placed
in the ATLAS cavern and gather data from sensors that are distributed over the whole detector
volume. Any ELMB node can be configured to transmit the calibrated sensor data either at regular
time intervals or on-change. In the latter mode, which compares the readings against pre-defined
thresholds, a first level of data reduction is achieved. All ELMB are interfaced to an associated
LCS in the underground counting rooms via CAN. These CAN buses are operated at 125 kbaud
allowing a maximum bus length of about 500 m. In total, 63 ELMB can be daisy chained on a
single CAN bus and are powered over the bus cable by dedicated power supplies. These power
supplies are located in the counting room thus enabling to power cycle all nodes in a bus in case of
errors. They also monitor the current consumption of the buses in order to detect aging effects of
the ELMB due to radiation.
Several buses can be connected to a single computer running an OPC server which decodes
the received CAN frames, may also perform conversion from raw to physical values, and sets the
relevant items in its address-space. This triggers the communication with PVSS resulting in an
update of the respective Datapoints. PVSS permits further calibration procedures to be applied to
the values, and to display and plot the results. Alarms can be generated by comparing the updated
values against pre-defined thresholds. These sensor values may also be used to trigger state changes
of the device-oriented FSM objects. In some cases, automatic actions may be initiated by means
of a Control script within the local PVSS system, or by any associated FSM object within the
FSM hierarchy. The values read are stored in the PVSS Oracle Archive. Finally, this database
is accessed asynchronously by the PVSS2COOL process which replicates the subset of the data
needed for offline analysis into the ATLAS Conditions Database.
7. Operations layer
The DCS operations layer provides the top level interface between the DCS BE systems and both,
human operators and the TDAQ run control system which allows automated DCS operation during
data acquisition runs. Further, the operations layer provides tools for efficient problem diagnostics
and handling by detector experts. The two main components of the operations layer are
• a Finite State Machine hierarchy representing the operational condition of each part of the
detector by a set of well defined states and distinct transitions between these states
• an Alarm System indicating problems on the level of individual detector devices.
Both components are represented by dedicated user interfaces, accessible at the DCS operator
station in the ATLAS control room and remotely through local and wide area networks.
7.1 Operations model
7.1.1 The detector as Finite State Machine hierarchy
The complete DCS BE is mapped onto a hierarchy of Finite State Machine (FSM) elements imple-





























Figure 11. The ELMB readout chain.
in the hierarchy allowing for the operation of the complete detector by means of a single FSM
object at the top of the hierarchy.
Hierarchy structure. Figure 12 illustrates the ATLAS FSM structure on the basis of example
parts of the tree. The ATLAS sub-detectors are divided into partitions corresponding to the so-
called Trigger, Timing and Control (TTC) partitions [3] of the data acquisition system which can
be read out independently. The partitions themselves are further subdivided into subsystems and
infrastructure services, which in turn may be structured geographically. The lowest level elements
are formed by individual or groups of devices.
The chosen hierarchy granularity is a trade-off between the desired level of detail, interde-
pendence of FSM elements with other branches of the hierarchy, and FSM software performance
constraints. The distribution of FSM objects within the network of control stations is done accord-
ingly: a GCS contains the top node, sub-detectors and their partitions are located on the respective
SCS, and all lower level objects are situated on their dedicated LCS connected to the FE devices.
State model. The individual detector FE devices and logical elements such as device groups
and geographical detector segments are represented by device-oriented FSM objects. The present
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Figure 13. Device object state model.
device-oriented object is triggered either by a spontaneous condition change or by means of
a dedicated command. Figure 13 shows the ATLAS device state model, allowing a device to
change from its ground state OFF to its operational state ON via optional stages. In case the
current condition is undefined, e.g. due to a lack of communication with a sensor, the state is
set to UNKNOWN. Other possible states include device or procedure specific conditions such as
ongoing calibration or power supply trips.
For logical objects, the mandatory states are READY or NOT_READY, reflecting conditions
for which data taking is possible or impossible (see figure 14). The state UNKNOWN is used in









































Figure 15. State rule example for a logical object.
states of the associated lower level objects (children) via state rules implemented using SML (see
figure 15).
State transitions. State transitions can be initiated for every FSM object in the hierarchy by
commands with the optional use of command parameters. Logical objects propagate the commands
to their children according to SML rules again using optional parameters such as a run type which
determines the set of configuration data to be used.
7.1.2 Event and error handling
During detector operation, any problem occurring must be detected, signaled and possibly auto-
matically recovered from. On the individual device or channel level, the PVSS alarm mechanism
is used to report any abnormal value of a single monitored parameter. Due to the vast number of
these parameters, the individual alarms are coupled to an alarm signalization mechanism within
the FSM on the lowest hierarchy level and propagated upwards in the hierarchy. This represents
an effective alarm reduction mechanism and allows for automatic error recovery at each hierarchy
level. Finally, all control application specific events, FSM state changes, command response, and
automatic actions are processed centrally for immediate operator feedback and are written to a
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Device alarms. For each critical parameter on a LCS, an alarm is raised if the parameter value is
out of the range specified for normal operation. The alarm thresholds are attributed to one of the
following severities:
• Warning: normal operation possible, but problem should be investigated in order to avoid
forthcoming malfunctions,
• Error: normal operation not possible or will become impossible very soon,
• Fatal: normal operation not possible and eventual implications for other systems, immediate
reaction required.
The alarms can be configured to require an acknowledgment by an operator in order to be
removed from the alarm system once the parameter value has left the problematic range. To avoid
the accumulation of a large number of alarms on the user interface, the individual device alarms
are grouped into summary alarms which are organized hierarchically in correspondence with the
FSM tree structure.
Higher level error signalization. Error signalization within the FSM hierarchy is performed us-
ing a parallel tree of “Status” objects. For each FSM object in the hierarchy, a dedicated Status
object instance is assigned with the states OK, WARNING, ERROR, and FATAL, signaling a prob-
lem in the corresponding part of the detector with the same severity definitions as specified above
for the device alarms. Any Status change is propagated upwards in the Status tree and thus allows
for error detection within the upper layers of the detector tree and permits to identify problematic
devices by following the propagation path downwards.
Automatic actions and error recovery. In addition to the fast detection of problems, the Status
allows the execution of commands in reaction to the problem or automatic error recovery at any
level in the hierarchy. For example, in case the ramp up (NOT_READY→ READY) of a calorime-
ter segment low voltage failed due to power supply trips, the resulting Status change to ERROR
can trigger a repetition of the state transition command (GOTO_READY). In case the trip was ac-
companied by a FATAL Status, e.g. due to overheating of equipment, the corresponding action in
response to FATAL would be to ramp down all devices within the segment (GOTO_NOT_READY).
Error masking. In the cases where problematic equipment cannot be repaired or replaced imme-
diately, problems with individual FSM objects or sub-trees can be temporarily masked by changing
the partitioning mode of the corresponding object, i.e. disabling a device or excluding a sub-tree.
Similarly, sets of or individual alarms may be masked at the level of operator interfaces.
Process logging. Each DCS control application process provides a detailed event log. In order
to classify the events, all messages use predefined message types such as Information, Warning,
Error, Fatal, Action. The types of reported events include:
• PVSS application-specific messages such as process status or errors (PVSS internal message
types),
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• FSM command received (Action) and execution progress (Information or chosen severity),
• control application error messages with respect to data and event handling (chosen severity).
A central logging process on a GCS collects all application logs and archives them on a central
database server.
7.2 Operator interfaces
The DCS is operated from a dedicated station within the ATLAS control room. The station pro-
vides several screens which host the two primary user interfaces — the FSM Screen for operation
of the detector Finite State Machine hierarchy and the Alarm Screen for alarm recognition and
acknowledgment. Further interfaces used on demand are tools for data visualization, process log
viewer, and operator log book. Full remote access to all user interfaces is possible by a terminal
server for expert operators only. Static status monitoring is provided by web pages on a dedicated
web server world-wide.
7.2.1 Finite State Machine operator interface
The ATLAS FSM Screen is the primary operator interface for the ATLAS DCS. It provides the
operator with a view of any selected FSM object and allows free navigation within the complete
detector FSM hierarchy. Each FSM object has an associated panel supplying the operator with
detailed information such as parameter values, trends, synoptic views within the context of the
selected object. Actual control is performed by means of FSM configuration and commands.
Figure 16 shows an example of the FSM Screen with its individual modules:
1. FSM module:
shows the currently active FSM object and its children. For each object, its name, State, Sta-
tus, and partitioning mode are displayed and various operations such as hierarchy navigation,
sending of commands, and partitioning actions can be performed.
2. Main module:
shows the main panel associated to the currently active FSM object. On navigation to another
FSM object within the hierarchy, the panel displayed is changed accordingly.
3. Secondary module with two possibilities:
• shows the secondary panel associated to a chosen FSM object – decoupled from the
main navigation — which allows displaying information for a second FSM object in
addition to the currently selected one.
• shows a 3-dimensional representation of all objects contained within the current FSM
subtree. The object shapes are loaded from a database and its color reflects the current
State or Status. The canvas can be freely rotated and zoomed. Further, the object
shapes can be used for navigation such that the operator, triggered by color changes,















Figure 16. FSM operator interface.
4. Navigator module:
navigation buttons, similar to those of a web browser, which allow accessing the navigation
history, i.e. back, forward, up, and home.
5. Access control module:
shows the user currently logged in and provides access control information such as the list
of users.
6. Overview module:
shows an overview of the State and Status of all ATLAS sub-detectors.
7. Connection module:
informs about the connection state of the complete distributed system of control stations with
respect to the operator station. The number of missing connections if any and the names of
disconnected systems are displayed as a tool-tip.
8. Error list module:
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Figure 17. FSM access control scheme. A user with the role LAR:Operator can control all FSM nodes
assigned to the LAR domain. Only a LARHV:Operator can operate the high voltage subsystem of a partition
exclusively.
filtered according to the Status severity and used for the direct navigation to the respective
level of the hierarchy thus allowing for quick error recognition and diagnostics.
The FSM Screen is protected by the Access Control (AC) mechanism using predefined privi-
leges. The “Monitor” privilege is always granted by default such that every user is able to observe
the status of the system. Two levels of control access are distinguished for each AC domain, the
“Operator” and the “Expert” role.
An Operator is allowed to perform FSM-related actions such as changing partitioning modes
and sending commands to all FSM objects within a particular AC domain. Each sub-detector has
an AC domain associated to its FSM subtree allowing a user with the sub-detector Operator role
to control the whole sub-detector as such. Additional sub-detector AC domains can be defined for
particular sub-systems such as a high voltage system. Only Operators within these domains can
control FSM objects within the corresponding subtree. Accordingly, as illustrated in figure 17, a
calorimeter Operator can send a complete partition to the READY state, but is neither allowed to
exclude a particular high voltage segment from the tree nor sending that segment to READY.
A domain Expert inherits the Operator role for the respective domain and can perform in
addition FSM commands which are declared as expert-only. Additionally, an Expert is allowed to
use control elements within FSM panels, can operate panels of the LCS control application in this
domain, and directly manipulate control application parameters.
7.2.2 Alarm screen
The ATLAS Alarm Screen (see figure 18), based on the JCOP alert screen implementation, dis-
plays the list of currently active alarms within the whole DCS, allowing an operator to identify
problematic detector elements, take corrective measures, and document the actions taken. Further
it can be used to diagnose problems at a later stage even after the alarms have been cleared. The
individual user interface elements are:
1. Alarm table
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• the severity,
• the description of the corresponding detector element,
• a short problem description,
• the parameter value at the current time and at the time when it was raised,
• the acknowledgment state if applicable,
• the time at which the alarm was raised.
Further options are available on a context menu for each line, such as a possibility to enter an
operator comment for the alarm or open a trend plot for the corresponding parameter value.
2. Filter settings
The list of alarms in the table can be filtered according to the following parameters:
• originating control station (Project),
• severity,
• element identifier (pattern match),
• acknowledgment type.
The filter settings can be pre-defined in presets.
3. Mode selection
Allows toggling between two modes:
• Current: Shows the list of currently active alarms.
• Historical: Shows alarms which were active during a specified time period.
In order to keep the number of active alarms to a minimal and manageable level, two alarm
reduction mechanisms exist. Firstly, summary alarms can be configured such that the alarm screen
suppresses the corresponding individual alarms if their number exceeds a predefined threshold.
In this case, only the summary alarm is visible to the operator. Secondly, active alarms can be
temporarily masked in case the problem is understood and cannot be solved on a short timescale.
7.2.3 Remote access
In addition to the user interfaces in the main control room, all user interfaces are available to
satellite control rooms allowing the respective operators to gain control of the DCS FSM provided
they own the proper access control privileges.
Terminal server. Full operator access to the control interfaces outside of the ATLAS local area
network is granted remotely only to registered detector experts using a Windows Terminal Server
(WTS) which is accessible from wide area networks. The user interfaces are started on this server
connecting only to relevant PVSS processes on the respective control station within the ATLAS
local area network, thus minimizing the work load put onto DCS machines. The use of conflicting
FSM commands is prevented by the mechanisms of the FSM toolkit which allows direct command
access only from the main operator interface unless the operator explicitly allowed shared control
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Figure 18. Alarm system operator interface.
WWW monitoring. The information provided by the FSM Screen is exported to a web server
in order to allow static monitoring of the ATLAS status. All FSM object information and their
corresponding main panels up to the level of sub-detector partitions are collected from persistent
user interface instances within a time interval of less than one minute. Thus, the user interface
is effectively mapped to a web page without imposing any additional load to the network of BE
control stations. The information is accessible world-wide using a common web-browser as shown
in figure 19.
7.2.4 Data visualization
Conditions data written to the database archive can be accessed in several ways. The FSM panels
displaying operational parameters either contain or allow to open PVSS trend plots required to di-
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Figure 19. WWW monitoring page showing the online status of the Tilecal sub-detector.
as the ROOT data viewer (see section 5.8.2) in a user friendly way, a coherent data element identi-
fication scheme is used, in contrast to the element naming within the control application which is
usually chosen according to hardware installation or technological constraints. An individual data
element is characterized by a description containing sub-detector identifier, partition name, and
subsystem name followed by a logical identification string, for example “TIL LBC LVPS 45 5V
Motherboard Brick Temperature”. The element description usually indicates the element position
with respect to the FSM hierarchy and can be used by offline analysis data queries without control
system expert knowledge.
7.3 DCS operation
The ATLAS DCS has to supervise all detector components at all times. A dedicated operator
in the ATLAS control room reacts on any non-desired change of detector conditions using the
operator interfaces introduced above. Any problem recovery requires close coordination with the
ATLAS subsystem operator concerned within the control room. Further, the operator performs any
change in detector condition or configuration which may be required using FSM commands on the
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For actual physics data taking, the TDAQ RC is allowed to send FSM commands to the parti-
tion level of the FSM hierarchy using the DDC interface (see section 5.10). During ongoing runs,
any error condition of a DCS partition can be signaled to RC which may react - depending on
the problem severity - by either stopping the data acquisition process or detaching the problem-
atic partition and trying to recover the problem by sending DCS FSM commands to the respective
partition.
7.3.1 Procedures for operation
Overall detector operation is organized in shifts, for which the operator has to complete a check list
of tasks to be performed at the shift start and prior to initiation of a data acquisition run. In a first
step, all currently active alarms have to be resolved or understood and masked. Subsequently, the
FSM hierarchy has to be prepared by including all detector partitions participating in the run and
checking the availability of all subtrees. Finally, the partitions have to be moved to the desired State
(for example READY) and Status OK. Thereafter, the operator keeps on monitoring the system and
reacts to problems emerging.
7.3.2 Alarm response
Whenever alarms are raised within the system, they are followed up according to their severity
WARNING, ERROR, and FATAL, with possible implications ranging from preventive actions to
the interruption of the data taking process. Normally, detailed problem diagnostics is delegated to
the respective sub-detector expert. During this investigation, the corresponding sub-system alarms
may be masked.
7.3.3 FSM operation
Operation using the FSM hierarchy requires well defined procedures since misconfigurations or
the sending of conflicting commands by several operators represents a considerable risk for the
efficient and safe detector operation.
By default, the FSM control is held exclusively by the operator. Whenever it is necessary for a
remote operator or expert to gain control over a particular part of the tree, the operator can move the
top FSM object of the respective sub-tree to the Shared partitioning mode. After the intervention
has been finished, the Exclusive mode is restored. In case of a persistent problem with one or a
group of FSM objects, the elements can be Disabled or Excluded from the hierarchy such that the
error condition is effectively removed from the system and normal operation can be resumed.
7.3.4 Run Control operation
The ATLAS Run Control operates the data taking with a state machine using a different state
model than that of the DCS FSM. In order to synchronize the DCS and RC states, each data taking
partition of the respective hierarchy has an associated object which handles state and command
synchronization via DDC. A RC command for any TDAQ TTC partition is interpreted by its DDC
Controller, translated to the corresponding DCS FSM command and sent to the FSM object of the
respective DCS partition. In turn, during data taking the RC must react on any state change of the
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Figure 20. DCS-TDAQ communication for a sub-detector. The DCS FSM partition serves as primary
interface for reporting state changes (red arrows) to the corresponding TTC partition within the TDAQ Run
Control hierarchy and may receive and execute RC partition commands (yellow arrows).
Figure 20 illustrates a typical example for the communication paths used. During a run, a prob-
lem within a DCS partition leads to a state change of the partition from READY to NOT_READY,
which is processed by its DCS DDC object and transferred to the corresponding DDC controller
within the RC tree (red path). The controller raises its error flag which is propagated to higher RC
hierarchy levels, indicating that the data acquisition may be problematic. In order to recover the
error, RC can either stop and restart the run by using RC transitions, or send a GOTO_READY
command as a Non-transition Command via DDC to the DCS partition, which will in turn execute
the action and propagate the command to the problematic subsystem (yellow path). During the RC
command execution in the DCS FSM, no interfering commands can be issued from any other oper-
ator interface. In the case of an unsuccessful recovery attempt, RC may exclude this TTC partition
from the data taking process.
8. Subsystem control
The Sub-detector Control Station has a central role for the supervision of a sub-detector. It allows
full stand-alone operation of the entire sub-detector, interacts with the corresponding part in the
TDAQ read-out, and provides connection to the global operations layer of ATLAS. The design and
implementation of the applications of the SCS and all connected LCS are the responsibility of the
sub-detector groups, using the standard software tools and packages described above. A central
DCS team in ATLAS guides the sub-detector groups in setting up and using these components.
This team also implements the supervision of all parts of ATLAS, which are not under the direct
responsibility of a sub-detector. These monitoring and control applications form the Common
Infrastructure Control (CIC), grouped within a dedicated hierarchy, represented by an SCS and its
associated LCS. External control systems are included in the CIC tree, retrieving the corresponding
information from the DCS Information Server (see section 5.9).
8.1 Sub-detectors


























































LCS Information Server (IS)
Figure 21. FSM structure of the common infrastructure.
tion 7.1.1. At the topmost level, each sub-detector consists of up to 6 TTC partitions. The structure
below this level can be organized in two ways — either “functionally” — in high voltage, low
voltage, detector electronics, gas, etc. — or “geometrically” — in barrel, side A, side C, etc. This
choice is based on practical aspects. The depth of the hierarchy is defined individually for each
sub-detector and can have up to the order of 10 levels. The lowest level is formed by the device
objects, such as voltage channels or sensors. The detailed structure of the sub-detector control and
the description of associated procedures can be found in [1] and the references therein.
8.2 Infrastructure
All parts of ATLAS, which are common to the detector are supervised by the CIC, which is struc-
tured as shown in figure 21.
This equipment is geographically distributed over the whole experiment and in total 6 LCS
have been set up, two serving the detector cavern UX15, and one for each of the electronics rooms
underground USA15L1, USA15L2, and US15L2, and one for the TDAQ computer rooms in SDX1
at the surface. The SDX1 station includes also the supervision of the gas building SGX1. The
sensor read-out is mainly based on the ELMB as described below.
8.2.1 Cavern and counting room environment
The general environment in UX15 is supervised using a CAN network with about 90 ELMB nodes,
which cover the whole volume of the experiment. About one third of the 8000 channels are
presently used, the rest are foreseen for future upgrades. All sensors described in the following
are read by these ELMBs.
Instrumentation has been installed to measure ambient parameters such as temperature, hu-
midity, pressure. More than hundred PT100 probes have been placed on the aluminum structures
of the detector. These sensors and their connections are designed to operate up to 200 ◦C in order
to be able to localize and assess major accidents, e.g. a fire or a cryogenic leak.
The space of the experiment outside of the calorimeters is accessible in periods without beam.
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Figure 22. Synoptic panel showing the presence of personnel in the ATLAS experiment. Blue indicates
activity in this cell, red signals an abnormal situation.
dedicated system called Finding Persons Inside ATLAS Area (FPIAA) [29] has been developed in
order to be able to track people inside the ATLAS cavern, e.g. during detector maintenance periods.
Some 500 infrared sensors detect the movement of people. These signals are analyzed in real time
and in a case of an abnormal situation of a person not moving for a long time, an alarm is generated
and displayed in the control room. The overview panel of the FPIAA system is shown in figure 22.
The level of radiation inside ATLAS needs to be continuously monitored. About 60 radiation
sensors [30] will be installed just outside of the calorimeter and in the Muon detector. Their FE
electronics is also read out by the ELMB network in the cavern.
In each of the counting rooms, ELMBs are installed to read temperature, humidity and pressure
sensors. Connection to analogue signals of the safety systems such as smoke and environmental
radiation levels is envisaged.
The electronics racks are cooled by air flow. A turbine unit forces air through the equipment
to be cooled and which is interspersed with water-air heat exchangers. The chilled water is pro-
vided by a secondary cooling plant as described below. Each turbine unit includes a monitor board
which supervises all operational parameters such as temperature, humidity, air flow, and electricity
distribution. A JCOP framework software component allows the supervision of the PLC of the
electricity distribution system in order to switch power to individual racks and combines the infor-
mation for a complete electronics room within an overview panel. Further, the power control and
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8.2.2 Infrastructure services
Cooling and ventilation. Cooling and ventilation is an infrastructure service provided by CERN.
A primary water cooling plant is installed at the ATLAS site on the surface. It provides cooling
to secondary plants underground, which cool a sub-detector or equipment like vacuum pumps or
cables. The operational parameters of each of these secondary plants are read out by the respective
sub-detector. In addition, it is foreseen that the CIC monitors the overall status of the primary and
all secondary cooling plants. The ventilation system for the underground rooms and the cavern is
operated autonomously and its status will be transmitted to the DCS IS.
Electricity distribution. The electricity distribution system as part of the CERN infrastructure is
supervised by a dedicated control system. It is planned that for the part relevant for ATLAS (e.g.
distribution cabinets, switch boards, UPS systems) the status is also monitored by DCS.
Gas systems. Each of the gas systems of the different sub-detectors is controlled by a dedicated
PLC. All PLCs are supervised by one PVSS system, which is not part of the ATLAS distributed
control system. The operational parameters are published by DIP and the DCS IS transfers them
into PVSS Datapoints for further distribution to the sub-detectors. The relevant sub-detector control
project sets up a FSM hierarchy for its gas system and includes it in its sub-detector tree.
Magnets and cryogenics. The ATLAS magnets and cryogenics systems are also controlled by
dedicated PLCs and monitored by a stand-alone PVSS station and information is retrieved via DIP
to the DCS.
Each of the infrastructure systems is represented in the CIC FSM hierarchy including corre-
sponding status panels. All infrastructure parameters are available to the sub-detector applications
and are archived to the CondDB.
8.2.3 LHC accelerator
The interaction by software between ATLAS and the LHC is handled by DCS. Dedicated instru-
mentation on both sides provides detailed information about luminosity and backgrounds via the
DIP protocol. The state of the LHC accelerator is presented to the ATLAS operator by the DCS.
A Beam Interlock System (BIS) combines signals in ATLAS indicating high backgrounds, and in
case of danger for the detector sends a hardware interlock signal to LHC in order to dump the
beams. The status of the BIS is presented by the CIC as an FSM unit.
8.2.4 DSS
The Detector Safety System (DSS) [31] has the task to detect possibly dangerous situations for
the detector e.g. due to overheating, failure of services, etc. and to shut down the relevant detector
automatically. It is based on redundant PLCs and is supervised by a stand-alone PVSS system. All
alarms of the DSS are transmitted to the DCS and can be used by the sub-detectors to execute prede-
fined control procedures. DSS actions can be delayed in order to enable DCS to execute shut-down
procedures before the DSS switches off the equipment. An example for this interaction is a cooling
failure of the counting room racks. As soon as the DSS triggers the corresponding alarm, the alarm
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react on this signal change within the DCS IS by shutting down the equipment in the racks in a
controlled way, before the DSS cuts the rack power after the predefined delay of 5 minutes.
However, the interaction between the DSS and DCS is limited to one direction: the DCS has
no way of influencing the operation of the DSS.
9. Conclusions
The design and implementation of the ATLAS DCS is based on 4 building blocks:
• Industrial solutions
• CERN-developed components (JCOP)
• ATLAS-wide integration packages
• Sub-detector specific controls procedures
This approach fulfills all requirements for coherent detector control and allows minimizing the
implementation and maintenance efforts.
When choosing commercial equipment for the experiment, the interface to the DCS was con-
sidered in the selection process. As standard hardware connection either Ethernet or the CAN
fieldbus are used and the communication standards are OPC and CANopen. In cases where no
commercial devices which fulfilled the specific requirements existed, in particular tolerance to ion-
izing radiation and operation in a strong magnetic field, a dedicated solution was developed. Most
of them include the general purpose I/O system ELMB as controls interface. The general design
of the ELMB allowed using it in a wide range of embedded applications and also as a stand-alone
unit reading sensors directly. As the ELMB is used in all LHC experiments a large volume of more
than 10 000 units has been produced, making this project very cost-effective.
Concerning software, the selection of the SCADA software product PVSS proved to be a good
choice. The readout interfaces for various types of FE equipment, the possibility to store conditions
data persistently in relational databases, the open design allowing for custom software extensions,
and the good scalability within a highly distributed system made PVSS suitable for all ATLAS
DCS applications. The use of PVSS has provided a common skeleton for the development and
implementation of the individual applications thus facilitating long-term maintainability, though at
the expense of dependence on external maintenance of PVSS itself. As the four LHC experiments
are similarly structured and hence have many common requirements, further synergy effects in
software development were achieved successfully in the JCOP collaboration. The resulting com-
mon software solutions were mostly engineered in the experiment controls group IT/CO at CERN
with additional contributions from individual LHC experiments.
In order to achieve a homogeneous control system for the whole of ATLAS, the DCS BE ap-
plications, distributed within a network of dedicated control stations, are hierarchically structured
following the natural segmentation of the detectors with several functional layers. Strong emphasis
was put on guidelines and development conventions and on the implementation of common appli-
cation components. The monitoring and control of each part of the control hierarchy is provided
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states of the different ATLAS sub-detectors to a single overall state. Efficient error recognition and
handling is provided by a centralized alarm system which raises alarms at the granularity of the
individual FE devices and propagates these alarms within the finite state machine hierarchy.
The individual DCS applications for the respective sub-detector components read and archive
conditions data, and implement dedicated control procedures for the associated equipment. Thus,
expert knowledge contained within these control procedures becomes an integrated part of the DCS
itself and evolves as operational experience is gained with time. This is particularly important as the
experiment is scheduled to run for more than a decade and personnel will change during this period.
Accordingly, an effort has been made to manage software centrally and to track all development
stages. In addition to the sub-detector control applications, supervision of the common infras-
tructure within ATLAS such as the racks in the counting rooms and environment monitoring was
implemented and is routinely running. Furthermore, external systems such as gas and cryogenics
services as well as the condition of the LHC accelerator are interfaced coherently using a multi-
platform communication protocol and are integrated within the common control mechanisms.
At the time of writing this paper, the control of about 50% of the ATLAS experiment is inte-
grated within the overall DCS. During the ongoing commissioning of ATLAS, it was proven that
the DCS scales up to the level needed and is able to continuously provide stable detector operation.
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